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Abstract
The paper offers a rigorous characterization of the notion of lexicographic definition:  a minimal
paraphrase formulated in the same language as the word defined and satisfying six lexicographic
principles,  which  are  formulated  and discussed.  The major  types  of  semantic  components  in  a
lexicographic  definition  are  identified  and described:  firstly,  central  vs. peripheral  components,
semantic-class  marking  components,  presuppositional  components,  actant-specification
components,  weak  components,  and  metaphor-marking  components;  secondly,  conjunctive  and
disjunctive components. Three additional topics are introduced: the roles that the definition plays in
a lexical entry (accounting for the semantic, syntactic and lexically restricted cooccurrence of the
headword); lexical units whose definition is problematic; lexical connotations and semantic labels.
Though  the  perspective  offered  on  lexicographic  definition  is  theory-oriented  – within  the
framework of  Explanatory Combinatorial  Lexicology (ECL) –,  a  strong emphasis  is  put on the
writing of actual definitions, a couple dozen of which is proposed and analyzed.
Keywords: lexical  semantics,  lexicographic  definition,  Explanatory  Combinatorial  Lexicology,
lexicographic methodology
1. Introduction
Lexical  meanings  form  the  very  core  of  natural  language.  First,  when  we  communicate
linguistically, we talk to convey informational content – and we do this by means of words. Second,
natural language plays a central role in the way we apprehend the world and try to make sense out
of it; this again, we achieve by using words. Consequently, the description of word meanings is the
most fundamental metalinguistic activity, one that surfaces naturally and constantly in daily life, for
instance, when interacting with young children or second language learners:
(1) – Luscious, what does it mean?
– Well, it depends, but if you talk about food, luscious food is food that has a very good and 
rather strong taste.
The answer given in (1) above is nothing but an improvised definition of luscious – at least, of one
of its senses. Word definitions are firmly associated with dictionaries, but the practice of defining
words – the most essential metalinguistic activity – is probably as old as linguistic communication
itself and, in all certainty, is far more ancient than lexicography. The definition of words should
therefore  concern  anyone  interested  in  natural  languages,  from any  perspective:  lexicology,  of
course,  but  also  psychology,  acquisition,  education,  natural  language  processing,  etc.  As  a
consequence, linguistic theory should provide a rigorous methodology for defining word meanings
if it aims at extensiveness (coverage of both lexical and grammatical knowledge), applicability and
usefulness.
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The present paper proposes a detailed characterization of the notion of lexicographic definition in
the specific formal framework of Explanatory Combinatorial Lexicology; its approach is therefore
very distinct from that of more theory-free writings on the same topic of lexicographic definition,
such as Benson et al. (1986: Ch. 4). However, our goal is not to review the history and diversity of
viewpoints on this notion (the relevant literature is enormous), but rather to present a well-specified
vision on how to model word meanings in dictionaries or, more generally, in lexicographic models.
The  Explanatory Combinatorial Lexicology (ECL) is an integral component of Meaning-Text
theory  – namely,  the  component  responsible  for  lexicological  aspects  of  linguistic  description
(Mel’čuk  et  al. 1995;  Mel’čuk 2013:  Ch. 11).  In conformity with its  fundamental  postulate,  the
representation of the meaning of a lexical unit is its lexicographic definition.
We will elaborate on the notion of lexicographic definition  by proceeding in three steps: formal
characterization of the definition (Section 2);  multiple  roles of the definition in  a  lexicographic
entry  (Section 3);  and  lexical  units  problematic  with  respect  to  definition  (Section 4).  We will
conclude  by  a  few  remarks  on  the  notion  of  lexical  connotation  and  that  of  semantic  labels
(Section 5).  Let  us  emphasize  that  the  present  text  updates  and  sharpens  several  ECL notions
introduced in a number of previous publications, in the first place, Mel’čuk (1988), Mel’čuk et al.
(1995: 72–117), Mel’čuk (2006) and Mel’čuk & Polguère (2016).
Writing  conventions. In  accordance  with  the  current  ECL  practice,  the  following  writing
conventions are observed.
• Names  of  lexical  units are  printed  in  small  capitals,  supplied,  when  necessary,  with
lexicographic (i.e. sense-distinguishing) numbers; they may also be accompanied with the
specification of their part of speech as subscript, when this is relevant:  ROOF(N) I [roof of the
palace], ROOF(N) II [find a roof for my business], vs. ROOF(V) [huts roofed with tin], ...
• Names of vocables – polysemous words or, more precisely, sets of lexical units that have
identical signifiers and are semantically related – are printed in small capitals: the vocable
ROOF(N),  containing  the  lexical  units  ROOF(N) I,  ROOF(N) II,  ...  Homonymous  vocables  are
distinguished  by  numerical  superscripts:  BAR(N)1,  whose  basic  lexical  unit1 means
‘commercial public place where alcoholic and other drinks can be drunk’;  BAR(N)2, whose
basic lexical unit means ‘piece of something with straight sides’; BAR(N)3, with basic lexical
unit meaning ‘thing that stops someone from doing something’; BAR(N)4 ‘fragment of a piece
of music’; BAR(N)5 ‘atmospheric pressure measure’; and BAR(N)6 ‘profession of lawyers’.
• Names of idioms ⌜ ⌝ ⌜ are enclosed in top corners “ ... ”: FRENCH FRIES⌝ ⌜, ON CLOUD NINE⌝,
⌜KEEP LEVEL HEAD⌝ ⌜, LET THE CAT OUT OF THE BAG⌝.
• All linguistic expressions are in italics.
• Linguistic  signifieds are  put  in  simple  quotes:  ‘upper  covering  of  a  building ...’ as  the
signified of ROOF(N) I.
• Finally, the names of notions particularly important to our discussion are printed, on the first
mention, in sans serif font.
1 The basic lexical unit of a vocable is the lexical unit that semantically controls the  polysemy structure of that
vocable. For instance, SHARK I ‘fish ...’ is the basic lexical unit of the vocable SHARK, because the other lexical unit
of this vocable,  SHARK II ‘person who takes advantage of others ... as if being a shark I’, is defined in terms of
SHARK I as its metaphorical derivative.
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2. Formal Characterization of Lexicographic Definitions
2.1 A Definition of Lexicographic Definition
We start with defining the notion of lexicographic definition.
The  lexicographic  definition  of  a  lexical  unit  – from  now  on,  simply  definition –  is  a
paraphrase of this  lexical  unit  1) done in the same language as the lexical unit  defined,
2) based  exclusively  on  the  knowledge  of  the  language  itself,  and  3) formulated  in
accordance with the six principles stated in Subsections 2.2 and 2.3 below.
When elaborating the ECL definition for a lexical unit, a lexicographer should not aim to describe
the entity/the fact of the real world denoted by this unit. The slogan is: “Think of the word, not of
the thing.” Conceptual ontologies (Hirst 2009) and world knowledge, no matter how closely they
⌜are associated with lexical  units,  are  left  out.  For  instance,  the lexical  unit  FRENCH FRIES⌝  is
defined as ‘long thin pieces of potato fried in oil’ – without mentioning the facts  that the dish
originated in Paris just before the French Revolution, was massively introduced into the USA in
early 1960s, is utterly unhealthy and was (for a short period) renamed  Freedom Fries during an
American anti-French campaign in 2003. An ECL definition carefully avoids reflecting knowledge
that could be qualified as encyclopedic or pragmatic. This does not, of course, prevent a definition
from  establishing  connections  between  the  universe  of  linguistic  semantics  and  that  of
⌜extralinguistic concepts: the definition of FRENCH FRIES⌝ tells us that each “fry” is potato, has a
particular form (long and thin) and is fried. The formal modeling of the meaning of a lexical unit
can and often does give indirect access to some essential properties of the corresponding concept
(Read 1982).
The definitional paraphrase must, as we just said, satisfy six main principles: three of them concern
the informational content of a definition (2.2), and three its form (2.3). We will first discuss these
principles, after which we will present a typology of semantic components of definitions (2.4).
Note that in our approach the definition of a given headword is not an autonomous component of
the  corresponding  lexicographic  entry  – in  the  sense  that  it  must  closely  collaborate  with  the
description of other  properties of the headword,  in particular its  restricted syntactic and lexical
cooccurrence properties (see Section 3).
2.2 Lexicographic Principles Concerning the Informational Content of a Definition
2.2.1 Equivalence Principle 
The  Equivalence  principle (also  known  as  the  Adequacy  principle,  Mel’čuk  1988:  30–31)
requires that the definition be a semantic equivalence of two linguistic entities:
Definiendum ≡ Definiens. 
Each of the two elements of this equivalence is formally constrained.
• The definiendum is the name of the headword, supplied in the case of a predicative lexical
unit with variables which indicate semantic actant slots that the headword controls. Thus,
what is defined is not simply the verb KISS(V) I.1, but the expression X kisses I.1 Y on Z. This
expression is called the  propositional form of the headword. (The notion of predicative
lexical unit is introduced immediately below.)
• The  definiens  – a  linguistic  paraphrase  of  the  definiendum –  must  be  the  most  exact
possible. In other words, it is an expression synonymous with the definiendum.
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It is a common practice to refer to the definiens as definition, which is natural since the definiens is
the essential part of the definitional equation. We allow ourselves to do the same when the context
excludes any misunderstanding.
Writing Conventions.   In this paper, a “Definiendum ≡ Definiens” equivalence is presented in a
box, as shown below for the definition of  KISS(V) I.1,  the basic lexical unit of the corresponding
vocable.2 The definiendum is italicized, since the propositional form is a schema of an utterance
(= carrier of a logical proposition) semantically analyzed by the definiens. The latter is not included
in semantic quotes (‘...’), in order to alleviate the exposition.
X kisses(V) I.1 Y on Z : X makes an expressive gesture towards Y
• X’s purpose being to express X’s positive feeling towards Y
• this gesture being X pressing X’s lips on a place Z on Y’s body
(, sucking punctually and lightly on Z)3
Figure 1. Definition of KISS(V) I.1
The verb KISS(V) I.1 is a typical representative of what are known as predicative lexical units: that is,
units  expressing  semantic predicates and  quasi-predicates,  which are opposed to  semantic
names.
Semantic  predicates  are  semantemes4 that  denote  facts  – actions,  states,  events,  processes,
relations, properties, etc. – and, as a result, are “binding,” that is, they control actantial slots and
bind their actants into a connected structure (Mel’čuk & Polguère 2008; Polguère 2012). All verbal,
adjectival and adverbial lexical units express semantic predicates, along with an important number
of nominal lexical units (X’s ARRIVAL at Y from Z, X’s REGRET over Y, EQUALITY between X and Y). As
for  quasi-predicates,  they  denote  entities  – individuals,  objects,  substances,  etc. –,  but  have  a
binding meaning as genuine predicates; they are expressed exclusively by nominal lexical units.
The semantically binding nature of quasi-predicates is due to the fact that the corresponding entities
are essentially implicated in particular situations from which they borrow their participants. These
are  expressed  as  semantic  actants  of  quasi-predicate  nouns,  which  belong  to  several  semantic
classes, for instance:
• Qualifying nouns, used rather to characterize than to refer: [individual who is an] IDIOT, PIG II,
ANGEL II, ... (as in You are an idiot, a pig, an angel, ...)
• Names of agents and patients: DRIVER [of a car], VICTIM [of a crime], TARGET [of an insult], ...
• Names of parents (kinship terms) and people holding social positions:  MOTHER/CHILD [of
somebody], MINISTER [of Foreign Affairs], PROFESSOR [of physics], ...
• Names of parts: ARM [of somebody], COVER [of a book], EDGE [of a city], ...
• Names of sets: PACK [of wolves], BUNCH [of idiots], PILE [of books], ...
• Names of substances/materials designed for a particular use: [cleaning] LIQUID, [printing] INK,
[fire] WOOD, ...
• Names of objects designed for a particular use:  BED [in which somebody sleeps],  COMPUTER
[which somebody uses to process information], TRAIN [by which somebody transports somebody/something
from one place to another], ... 
2 The vocable KISS(V) is polysemous, with at least the three following senses: KISS(V) I.1 [He always kisses his daughter
before  she  goes  to  sleep.],  KISS(V) I.2 [They  kissed  passionately.],  and  KISS(V) II [A gentle  breeze  was  kissing  the  tree
branches.].
3 The parentheses indicate a weak component of a definition, see Subsection 2.4.1.5 below.
4 A semanteme is the signified of a lexical unit of the language under consideration.
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From  the  viewpoint  of  their  actantial  structure,  quasi-predicates  fall  into  two  major  classes:
entitative quasi-predicates vs. relational quasi-predicates.
1) An entitative quasi-predicate denotes a physical entity (living being, object,  substance,  place,
etc.)  involved in a situation: for instance,  ‘part  of X’ or ‘object used by X for Y’.  X, the first
semantic actant of such quasi-predicate – as in ‘X’s medication for Y’ – can be expressed as its
syntactic dependent: John’sX medication for headacheY.
2) A relational quasi-predicate denotes an entity X standing in a particular relation to another entity
Y.  What  is  specific  about  this  type  of  quasi-predicate  is  that  X,  the  first  semantic  actant  of  a
relational quasi-predicate – as in ‘X, who is  father of Y’ – cannot be expressed as its syntactic
dependent, but is readily expressible by means of a copula: JohnX is Mary’sY father.
Lexical units that are neither semantic predicates nor quasi-predicates are semantic names. These
are expressed exclusively by nouns whose meanings are not binding and which denote entities:
RHINOCEROS,  [the] SUN,  DANDELION,  WATER, etc. The definiendum of a semantic name does not
contain actantial variables and is thus formally simpler than that of a predicative lexical unit.
Sun : the celestial body
• that is bright and hot
• that provides Earth with light and heat
• that appears, moves across the sky and disappears within regular intervals
• that is seen as a yellow disk with rays
Figure 2. Definition of SUN
We have dwelt on the predicative/non-predicative nature of a lexical unit in the role of headword
because this nature directly conditions its free and restricted cooccurrence (Mel’čuk 2015: Ch. 12;
Polguère 2016: 38–41, 301–303). A lexicographic account of the free cooccurrence of a headword
consists  in  specifying  its  meaning  and  its  syntactic  class  (roughly,  its  part  of  speech),  while
accounting for its restricted cooccurrence requires much further data.
To sum up: the bulk of the lexicon of any language consists of predicative lexical units, so that
consistent application of the Equivalence Principle requires, in the first place, the identification of
the actantial slots of the headword if it is predicative. (A good methodology is to presuppose that,
by default, the lexical unit under analysis is predicative.)
2.2.2 Semantic Decomposition Principle 
The  Semantic decomposition principle requires that the definition (that is, the definiens) of a
lexical  unit  be  its  semantic  analysis,  that  is  the  decomposition  of  its  meaning  into  simpler
meanings. Let us specify the notion of simpler meaning with an example: the meaning ‘egg’ is
simpler  than  the  related  meaning  ‘omelette’  because  when  one  says  omelette one  implicitly
expresses the meaning ‘egg’, but not the other way around.
Semantic decomposition principle entails three consequences.
Consequence 1.  The definiens cannot be just formulated as a simple synonym of the definiendum.
If this is an exact synonym, what we have is not a definition, but a cross-reference. If this is an
approximate  synonym,  the  result  is  a  pseudo-definition,  which  characterizes  the  headword
approximately; such pseudo-definitions should be proscribed.
Consequence 2.  Semantic decomposition in the definiens ensures the absence of vicious circles in
the system of definitions. For instance, consider the verb  PAINT(V) I.1 [He painted the fence.] and the
noun PAINT(N) I [She put three layers of paint.]. One should not define PAINT(V) I.1 by means of PAINT(N) I
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(that is, as  PAINT(V) I.1 ≈  ‘cover with paint I’, as many dictionaries do), while, at the same time,
defining  PAINT(N) I by means of  PAINT(V) I.1 (PAINT(N) I ≈ ‘colored substance designed to be used to
paint(V) I.1’).  In  such  a case,  the  researcher  has  to  determine  which  of  the  two lexical  units  is
semantically simpler and use it to define the other. In our pair, PAINT(V) I.1 is simpler, since to paint
does not necessarily imply the use of paint; cf. (2), where the juice of boiled beets does not qualify
as PAINT(N) I.
(2) Margaret painted the fence red with the juice of boiled beets.
The definition of PAINT(V) I.1 can now be formulated as follows:
X paints(V) I.1 Y color Z with W
by means of U
: X causes 2 that Y becomes of color(N) I.1 Z5
• by spreading on Y substance W of color(N) I.1 Z by 
means of U
• W being liquid
Figure 3. Definition of PAINT(V) I.1 – Preliminary version
Note that, first, we consider here only the basic lexical unit of a polysemous vocable6 and second,
we will  return  to  this  definition  later,  in  Subsection  2.3.1,  in  order  to  propose  another  – more
accurate – version of it.
Then, the definition of PAINT(N) I is readily formulated:
Z-y paint(N) I for X to use on Y : product I, designed to be used by X for painting(V) I.1 Y 
color(N) I.1 Z
• that is of color(N) I.1 Z
• that is liquid
 Figure 4. Definition of PAINT(N) I
As one can see,  neither definition entails a vicious circle and each represents the meaning of the
corresponding  lexical  units  adequately:  the  action  of  painting(V) I.1 does  not  imply  the  use  of
paint(N) I,  and  the  paint(N) I is  a  product I designed  to  be  used  for  painting(V) I.1 (for  a  detailed
discussion of the pair PAINT(V) ~ PAINT(N), see Wierzbicka 1992: 167–169).
Consequence 3.  Semantic decomposition, illustrated in the above definitions, functions recursively
and leads  – sooner  or  later,  but  inevitably – to  semantemes which  are  indecomposable,  that  is,
indefinable  in  terms  of  semantemes  of  the  same language:  these  are  semantic  primitives,  or
semantic primes (Wierzbicka 1972, 1985 and many of Wierzbicka’s subsequent titles). We will
return later to the notion of semantic primes – in Subsection 4.2.4, when discussing the problem of
lexicographic description of these very special semantemes.
As far as the depth of decomposition in a definition is concerned, see Subsection 2.3.1 below.
2.2.3 Univocity Principle 
The Univocity principle requires that all the elements of a definition be univocal, which means that
each  lexical  element  in  a  definition  must  correspond  to  one  semanteme  only  and  that  each
semanteme is represented by one lexical element only.
5 Two  semantemes  of  causation  are  distinguished  (Kahane  &  Mel’čuk  2006):  ‘X  causes 1 Y’ represents  non-
voluntary causation, where X is the cause of Y  [The drought  caused a severe famine.];  ‘X causes 2 Y’ represents
voluntary causation, where X is the causer of Y [Alan slyly caused the failure of the negotiations.].
6 This wordsense must be distinguished from PAINT(V) I.2 ‘represent by painting(N) I.1 ...’ [She was painting an apple tree
in blossom on the left wall.]. Lexicographic numbers of the lexical units that appear in the definitions of PAINT(V) I.1
and PAINT(N) I are supplied by ourselves.
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This  principle  boils  down  to  the  two  following  conditions  on  definitional  metalanguage:
1) definitions contain no ambiguity; 2) a given meaning is always expressed in the same way in all
definitions – that is, the synonymy of different elements used in definitions is excluded. 
In order to meet the first condition, a definition is composed of semantemes and not words. Thus,
the  definition  of  TABLECLOTH does  not  use  a  vague  expression  ‘table’,  but  the  well-specified
semanteme ‘table(N) I.1’ (piece of furniture – the basic lexical unit of the corresponding vocable),
opposed to the semanteme ‘table(N) I.2’ (the group of people sitting around a table(N) I.1 [She lifted the
pot, and the whole table screamed!]):
tablecloth for X to use on Y : cover(N) designed to be used by X
• to cover(V) a table(N) I.1 Y
• on which the meal is put
• that serves to protect Y
• that is a piece of cloth or cloth-like material
Figure 5. Definition of TABLECLOTH
The condition of non-ambiguity requires to make explicit the designation of each wordsense by
using  exclusively  semantemes,  identified  by  lexicographic  numbers.  This  is  not  a  theoretical
problem but rather a practical one. In the description of the whole lexicon of a language – hundreds
of  thousands of  lexical  units –  a  consistent  numbering of  all  wordsenses  is  impossible  without
computer  tools,  which  would  ensure  the  management  of  lexical  interconnections  within
lexicographic entries. (Such an approach is implemented in Réseau Lexical du Français, or French
Lexical Network, see Polguère 2014.) In this paper, our own definitions are wanting because all
elements of their definiens are not genuine semantemes. Thus, in the above definition, the intended
wordsenses of COVER(N), DESIGNED, etc. are not properly identified.
The second condition is much harder to satisfy. The lexicographer has to make sure that a given
meaning is expressed always – that is, in all definitions – by the same configuration of semantemes.
First  the  lexicographer  must  identify  the  semantic  content  in  question  and  then  attach  to  it  a
configuration of semantemes that would be acceptable in all possible cases. Let us illustrate with
four definitions borrowed from Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (LDOCE 2017):
FILE(N)1 4 a metal tool with a rough surface that you rub on something to make it smooth
PLIERS a small tool made of two crossed pieces of metal, used to hold small things or 
to bend and cut wire
SAW(N)2 1 a tool that you use for cutting wood. It has a flat blade with an edge cut into 
many V shapes
SCREWDRIVER 1 a tool with a narrow blade at one end that you use for turning screws 
The Univocity principle is violated in these definitions at least in two ways:
• All of the tools are used for something, but this fact is not conveyed in the same way in the
above definitions: the verb [to] USE is not present at all in the definition of FILE(N)1 4, and in
the three other definitions it appears under two forms (used or that you use).
• The tool parts are not presented in the same way: for instance, in SAW(N)2 1 we have ‘It has a
[flat] blade’, while in  SCREWDRIVER 1, the same meaning is expressed as ‘with a [narrow]
blade’. 
The four lexical units are semantically quite close: they express the same type of semanteme – an
entitative quasi-predicate denoting an artifact designed for a particular use (cf.  Subsection 2.2.1
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above).  Therefore,  their  definitions  are  supposed  to  reflect  this  semantic  closeness:  they  must
feature  the  same  generic  component  (see  Subsection 2.3.2  below)  and  the  same  general
organization. To make a long story short, there is a schematic template for the definitions of tools:
<L> for X to use on Y : tool I for X to use on Y
• <purpose of use: in order to ...>
• <mode of use: by V-ing ...>
• <structure of the tool I: that consists of ...>
 Figure 6. Definition template for lexical units denoting tools
Here is the definition of FILE(N)1 4 written in conformity with this template:
file(N)1 4 for X to use on Y : tool I for X to use on Y
• in order to smoothen Y’s surface or reshape Y
• by rubbing Y’s surface with this tool I in order to remove 
small amounts of material from it
• that consists of a working part, which is hard and rough, and 
of a handle
 Figure 7. Definition of FILE(N)1 4
The above definition template allows for the standardization of dozens of definitions since it applies
to all lexical units that have the noun TOOL I as their generic term.
The same problem of coherence arises for thousands of definitions: names of inhabitants, names of
professions,  of  emotions,  of  illnesses,  of  physical  contacts,  etc.;  verbs  of  physical  state,  of
communication, of interpersonal relations, of perception, etc. This enumeration shows the path to
follow in order to obtain a systematic standardization of semantic configurations: definitions must
be  elaborated  according  to  semantic  classes  of  the  headwords,  based  on  schematic  definition
template for each of these classes.7
2.3 Lexicographic Principles Concerning the Form of a Definition 
Having presented the three fundamental principles that constrain definitions from the viewpoint of
their content, we switch now to the three principles dealing with the form itself of definitions: they
specify the way the definitions must be structured. In actual practice, of course, both aspects – the
content  and  the  form  of  a  definition –  are  inseparable.  We  have  already  introduced  formal
considerations when discussing the definiendum and the definiens; we have even proposed a sketch
of the definition template for quasi-predicative nouns denoting tools.
2.3.1 Minimal Decomposition [= Maximal Block] Principle 
Each semanteme that is not a semantic primitive is decomposable; therefore, we face the obvious
question: to what degree the meaning of the headword must be decomposed in a definition? The
ECL prescribes the minimal degree of decomposition – for the following two reasons.
• Maximal decomposition – up to semantic primitives – produces too complex a definiens that
requires an excessive effort to be interpreted and understood.
7 The requirement of systematic lexicographic processing by semantic classes of lexical units applies not only to
definitions; it concerns the lexicographic entries taken globally. Cf. Ju. Apresjan (2008: 57): “To sum up, the third
principle of systematic lexicography is the requirement that all salient lexical classes should be fully taken into
account and uniformly described in a dictionary in all of their linguistically relevant properties.”
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• The more one decomposes a definiens, the less the resulting definition can be manipulated
as a real paraphrase of the headword.
As a consequence, if we do not want to accept variable decomposition depths (determined by some
ad hoc considerations), then the level of semantic decomposition in the definiens has to be minimal.
In other words: 
A configuration of semantemes inside a definition which can be expressed by a lexical unit
of the language under description – that is, which is lexicalized in this language – must be
expressed in the decomposition by the semanteme corresponding to this lexical unit.
This  principle  is  known  as  the  Minimal  decomposition  principle or  – in  the  perspective  of
lexicalizing the definition – the Maximal (definitional) block principle. 
The  adherence  to  this  principle  requires  us  to  revise  the  definition  given  in  Figure 3,
Subsection 2.2.2, for the verb  PAINT(V) I.1. The generic component of this definition – ‘X causes 2
that Y becomes of color(N) I.1 Z’ – is lexicalized in English by the verb COLOR(V) I.2 [Alex colored the
cake with raspberry  extract.].8 We are thus obliged to reduce the initial  definition of  PAINT(V) I.1,  by
reformulating it as follows:
X paints(V) I.1 Y color Z with 
W by means of U
: X colors(V) I.2 Y color(N) I.1 Z
• by spreading on Y substance W of color(N) I.1 Z by means
of U
• W being liquid
Figure 8. Definition of PAINT(V) I.1 – Revised version
Some other approaches than ECL, for instance Natural Semantic Metalanguage (Wierzbicka 1972,
1985, 1992, etc.), resort rather to maximal decomposition in definitions. This is justified by the fact
that they concentrate on interlingual correspondences and their final goal is to identify semantic
universals, using semantic primitives in the definitions.9
2.3.2 Hierarchical Structure Principle 
The  definiens  of  a  definition  consists  of  configurations  of  semantemes,  called  (semantic)
components of the definiens.  These components are organized in a hierarchical structure; the
definition must explicitly encode this hierarchy of components.  This formal constraint is called
Hierarchical structure principle.
Terminological  remark.  The term  component designates configurations of semantemes,  while
elementary entities that constitute the definiens (individual semantemes, actantial positions, etc.) are
its  elements.  A definiens  is  thus  structured  in  components,  the  latter  being  configurations  of
elements. The elements of a definiens are “lexical units” of this definiens, while the components are
“semantic clauses.” (A definiens component may, of course, include just one element.)
The hierarchy of components of a definiens is based on the crucial distinction between a central
component  and  a  set  of  peripheral  components.  This  will  be  examined  in  more  detail  in
Subsection 2.4.1.1.
2.3.3 Semantic Network Principle 
The Semantic network principle concerns the formal nature of the definiendum and the definiens.
It stipulates that a definition actually is an equivalence between two semantic networks (Polguère
8 COLOR(V) I.1 is a non-agentive verb seen in Raspberry extract colored the cake faint pink.
9 For an introduction to definitions in the framework of Natural Semantic Metalanguage, see Goddard (2011).
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1997, Mel’čuk 2012: Ch. 4): graphs whose nodes represent semantemes of the language and the
arcs, the semantic dependencies connecting predicative nodes (predicates and quasi-predicates) to
their actants. Thus, the definition of KISS(V) I.1, shown in Subsection 2.2.1, is a verbal “translation”
of the equivalence in Figure 9 below.
Figure 9. Definition of KISS(V) I.1 as an equivalence between two semantic networks 
The  information  content  of  the  diagram  of  Figure 9  corresponds  to  a  genuine  definition  of
KISS(V) I.1: it is a complete and precise representation of the meaning of the verb. The right-hand
side  semantic  network  in  Figure 9  encodes  the  whole  semantic  content  of  KISS(V) I.1:  all  the
semantemes,  all  semantic  dependencies,  hierarchical  structuring  of  semantic  components,  their
semantic roles (“Purpose” and “Form”) and the communicative organization. On this latest point,
the underscoring of a node within a given subnetwork shows that the corresponding semanteme is
communicatively  dominant  in  the  respective  semantic  substructure  (Polguère  1997):  thus,  the
definiens  in  Figure 9  means,  in  the  first  place,  ‘[make]  an  expressive  gesture’.  The  boldface
parentheses in the right bottom quarter  of the definiens indicate a weak component,  see 2.4.1.5
below.
Beside being a representation of the headword’s meaning, the content of Figure 9 is also a formal
object from which one can derive many textual formulations, which are equivalent (paraphrastic)
definitions of the headword. These include:
• exhaustive definitions  – such as those illustrated above, which clearly show the internal
structure of the definiens in terms of an enumeration of hierarchized components;
• pedagogical definitions, which should present only essential semantic elements, simplifying
or even omitting, if need be, some parts of the definiens.10
Moreover,  only  this  type  of  representation,  sufficiently  formalized,  is  accessible  for  semantic
computation,  necessary  in  order  to  automatically  compare  lexical  meanings,  activate  polysemy
10 On the elaboration of pedagogical definitions in the ECL framework, see Milićević (2016) and Sikora (2016).
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patterns for hypothetical wordsense generation à la Pustejovsky (1995)11 or carry out inferences of
the type He kissed her ⇒  He likes her.
Space limitations prevent us from explaining in more detail the formalization proposed (semantic
networks) and from presenting lexicographic tools that allow the researcher to utilize this type of
definition in a rigorous and ergonomic way. 
The six fundamental principles which underlie the elaboration of definitions in the ECL correspond
– more or less – to  the problems repeatedly raised in the vast literature on the lexicography of
general language dictionaries (Adamska-Sałaciak 2012).
The application of the said principles – in particular, the Hierarchical structure principle – requires a
good  understanding  of  the  different  types  of  definition  components,  which  leads  us  to  the
presentation of a tentative typology of semantic components.
2.4 Types of Semantic Components of a Definition
The  semantic  components  in  a  definiens  can  be  characterized  according  to  two  independent
dimensions: the function of the component in the definiens (2.4.1) and its logical structure (2.4.2).
2.4.1 Types of Semantic Components According to their Function in the Definition
2.4.1.1 Central Component vs. Peripheral Components 
The  definiens  of  a  standard  definition  is  divided  in  two  major  parts:  the  obligatory  central
component and an optional set of peripheral components.12 
The  central component is the minimal paraphrase of the headword. There is only one central
component per definition and it is obligatory; moreover, its lexicalization has to be of the same deep
part of speech as the headword, that is, to have the same passive syntactic valence (see 3.2 below).
The number of peripheral components is theoretically unlimited. Each one of them is necessary
to express a fragment of the headword’s meaning. Taken together, they are sufficient to distinguish
the  headword  by  its  meaning  from all  other  semantically  related  lexical  units.  In  our  textual
definitions, each peripheral component is put on a separate line and preceded by a bullet “•”.
Thus, the lexeme CARROT I.1 [to peel three carrots] can be defined as follows, with one central and four
peripheral components.
carrot I.1 for X [to eat] : vegetable for X to eat
• that is sweetish
• that is orange
• that is long and pointed
• that is the root of a plant
Figure 10. Definition of CARROT I.1
Each peripheral component is communicatively dominated by the central component or by another
peripheral component, which is, in its turn, communicatively dominated by the central component.
11 This can be useful for several purposes. For instance, it can be used to help the lexicographer by proposing possible
wordsenses for the lexical item under consideration in accordance with the properties of the given semantic class;
the  lexicographer  can  confirm  or  reject  these  hypotheses.  Wordsense  generation  can  also  be  used  in  Natural
Language Processing to generate a possible interpretation of a word occurrence in a text, to compensate for the fact
that  all  lexicalized  senses  cannot  be  expected  to  be  thoroughly  described  in  computerized  lexical  resources.
Furthermore, it can be used in experiments in psycholinguistics to test the plausibility of neological use of words.
12 For some cases of non-standard definitions, see Subsection 4.1 below.
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A definition  must  also  encode  the  semantic  nature  of  the  relation  between  each  peripheral
component and the component it is subordinated to. Figure 11 presents the hierarchical structure of
the definiens in the above definition.
‘vegetable for X to eat’
Taste
‘sweetish’
Color
‘orange’
Shape
‘long and pointed’
Is part of
‘root of a plant’
Figure 11. Hierarchical structure of the definiens in the definition of CARROT I.1
The distinction “central  component  vs. peripheral components” is,  of course, reminiscent of the
well-known  Aristotelian  notion  of  definition  by  genus  proximum et  differentiæ  specificæ
(= ‘by the closest kind and specific differences’). We are using here an old recipe, adapting it to
definitions of ECL: our central component of a definition roughly corresponds to the generic part of
the classical definition, and our peripheral components represent specific differences.
The central component plays a classifying role, allowing for semantic grouping of lexical units that
denote facts or entities of a particular class. In the best-case scenario, the central component is
composed of just one semanteme, if the language has the corresponding lexical unit – for instance,
the central component ‘tool I’ in the definition of FILE(N)1 4 in Figure 7 (2.2.3 above). It is frequent,
however, that such lexicalization is missing, so that it turns out necessary to use a configuration of
semantemes as central component in a definiens – for instance, ‘expressive gesture’ in Figure 9
(2.3.3 above).
Peripheral components, the topic of the next subsections, are of five different types: semantic-class
marking  components,  presuppositional  components,  weak  components,  actantial  typing
components, and metaphor marking components.
2.4.1.2 Semantic-Class Marking Components 
The semantic-class marking component of a definiens stands in a privileged relation with the
central component: it expresses a chunk of the headword’s meaning that is crucial to determine the
semantic class of the headword and that the central component fails to express.
Let us consider a revealing example: the definition of the noun RAIN(N) I.1.13
rain(N) I.1 on Y : water falling from the sky on Y or 1 this falling
• in the form of drops
Figure 12. Definition of RAIN(N) I.1 – Preliminary version
This definition is incomplete: it lacks a very important piece of information about the meaning of
RAIN(N) I.1, namely,  that it denotes – like SNOW(N) I.1, FOG, THUNDERSTORM, etc. – a particular type
of weather phenomenon. It is thus necessary to complement the above definition with a semantic
component that expresses the fact that  RAIN(N) I.1 denotes a weather phenomenon – the semantic-
class marking component.
rain(N) I.1 on Y : water falling from the sky on Y or 1 this falling
• in the form of drops
• this falling being a weather phenomenon
Figure 13. Definition of RAIN(N) I.1 – Revised version
13 The central component in the definiens contains a disjunction (‘or 1’); disjunctive components are discussed in
2.4.2 below.
Journal of Cognitive Science 19(4), 2018, pp. 417–470. 12/30
Not every definition must have such a component – in fact, all definitions presented before do not.
It  is  needed only if  the central  component does not do the job of providing the corresponding
semantic  classification  of  the  headword.  On the  other  hand,  the  use  of  this  component  is  not
exceptional. For instance, the verbs of the type of MURDER(V),  RAPE(V),  MUG(V), etc. require in their
definition the semantic-class marking component ‘this action being a crime’: X murders Y means ‘X
kills Y intentionally, this action being a crime’.
2.4.1.3 Presuppositional Components
A lexical meaning ‘L’ may include a component ‘⟦P⟧’, known as a presupposition of ‘L’. ‘⟦P⟧’ has
the following property: 
If the Speaker says not L – that is, if he negates ‘L’ –, then the component ‘⟦P⟧’ continues to
be affirmed (that is, ‘⟦P⟧’ is not accessible to negation).
For instance, X authorizes Y to do Z means ‘X⟦, who has an authority over Y,⟧ allows Y to do Z’. A
little girl can allow (or not allow) her mother to enter her room; but to say  Lola authorizes her
mother to enter implies that the relations between the child and her parents in this family are not
normal: the child is presented as having some authority over her parents. The semantic component
‘X has an authority over Y’ is not negated if the Speaker says  X does not authorize Y to do Z. If
someone says  Lida does not authorize Igor to drink vodka,  he still  affirms that Lida has some
authority over Igor, as far as alcohol consumption is concerned.
A presupposition  in  a  definition  is  necessarily  a  peripheral  component:  the  central  component
cannot be presupposed. Following our conventions, a presupposition is positioned at the beginning
of  the  definiens  – that  is,  before  the  central  component  (which,  as  we  think,  facilitates  the
perception of the definition). Moreover, it is expressed by means of a special syntactic construction:
⟦an  absolute  participial  phrase;  graphically,  it  is  included  in  special  brackets   ... ⟧.  Figure 14
illustrates this with the definition of the lexeme AUTHORIZE.
X authorizes Y to do Z :
⟦ • X having an authority over Y, ⟧
X allows Y to do Z
Figure 14. Definition of AUTHORIZE
X authorizes Y to do Z also presupposes ‘Y wants to do Z’. However, this other presupposition is
part of the meaning ‘X allows Y to do Z’ and is explicitly expressed in the definition of ALLOW. As
a result, it is implicitly present in the definition of AUTHORIZE.
2.4.1.4 Actant Specification Components
An actant specification component expresses a semantic constraint on a particular actantial slot.
In  other  words,  it  specifies  the  semantic  nature  of  the  corresponding  actant.  The  definition  of
DRINK(V) below will serve to illustrate this, with a component that specifies Y that X is drinking as
being liquid.
X drinks(V) Y : X ingests Y
• Y being liquid
• by putting Y into the mouth and swallowing Y
( • in order to satisfy the physiological need of water in the body )
Figure 15. Definition of DRINK(V)
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An actant specification component, such as ‘Y being liquid’, behaves just like a presupposition in
that it is not accessible to negation; as seen in (3) below, this component resists the negation of the
verb: 
(3) Igor does not drink kvas. 
Sentence (3) does not negate the fact that kvas is a liquid – on the contrary, the reader who does not
know what kvas is (= a Russian non-alcoholic fermented beverage) learns from (3) that it is a liquid
substance.
In spite of its behavior under negation, an actant specification is not a presupposition: the former
indicates the semantic class of the actant, while the latter brings in information about a given state
of affairs. Thus, the presupposition ‘X having an authority over Y’ in the definition of AUTHORIZE
(Figure 14, 2.4.1.3) does not restrict what semantemes can instantiate the variables X and Y, while
‘Y being liquid’ in the definition of DRINK restricts the range of potential values of Y.
An  actant  specification  can  be  semantically  so  poor  – ‘X  being  a  living  being/an  action/a
process ...’ – that it  does not add significant semantic content to the definiens. In such case,  it
functions strictly for the typing of variables (in the sense used in logic and computer science).
2.4.1.5 Weak Components
The definiens of a headword may contain optionally expressed components: at the conceptual level
– the actual situation the Speaker to talking about –, the corresponding situation elements are not
necessary for this situation to be referred to by means of the headword. Such components are called
weak components; a weak component is shown by parentheses in our definitions. For instance,
the component ‘in order to satisfy the physiological need of water in the body’ in the definition of
DRINK(V) above  (Figure 15,  2.4.1.4)  is  weak:  one  can  drink  something  for  pleasure  (coffee  or
alcohol), for medical reasons (cough syrup), etc. Nevertheless, ‘X drinks Y’, considered in isolation,
in the first place implies satisfying X’s physiological need of water. Additionally, several English
expressions manifest a link between ‘drink’ and ‘satisfy a physiological need of water (= thirst)’
(e.g., drink to one’s thirst and drink thirstily).
Another stock example of weak component is found in the definition of the verb TEACH: 
X teaches Y to Z (in W) : X acts to cause 2 that Y is learned by Z
• Y being structured knowledge
• by X communicating elements of Y to Z
( • in organization W )
Figure 16. Definition of TEACH
X teaches Y to Z  (in W) is defined as an activity performed in an organization W: a school,  a
university, a military academy, and the like; if one says Lida teaches mathematics, this implies by
default that she teaches at a school or a university. However, there are also private teachers, who
teach  outside  of  any  organization.  The  above  definition  remains  valid  for  them  too as  the
component ‘in organization W’ is weak: it can be dropped any time the Speaker does not need it. 
There are several varieties of weak components in definitions; we cannot present all of them, but we
would like to dwell on one interesting type widespread in languages that have grammatical gender
(Romance  and  Slavic  languages,  in  the  first  place).  Thus,  in  French,  the  masculine  noun
ÉTUDIANT(MASC) ‘student’ is applicable to a man only – a female student is denoted by the feminine
noun ÉTUDIANTE(FEM). However, things change in the plural: the expression des étudiants(MASC)PL can
denote a mixed group (for instance,  three female and one male students).  On the contrary,  the
expression  des  étudiantes(FEM)PL can  refer  only  to  women.  Consequently,  the  component  ‘of
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masculine sex’ in the definition of ÉTUDIANT(MASC) is weak, whereas ‘of feminine sex’ is not weak in
the definition of ÉTUDIANTE(FEM). Note that far from all masculine nouns that denote beings featuring
a biological gender “lose their masculinity” in the plural: the phrase les frères(MASC)PL ‘the brothers’
denotes only a set of males,14 while les cousins(MASC)PL ‘the cousins’ can denote a mixed group as well.
Similarly, the masculine  taureaux(MASC)PL ‘bulls’ denotes only males, but the masculine  chiens(MASC)PL
‘dogs’ can denote a mixed group or even a group of female dogs (like in English).
2.4.1.6 Metaphor Marking Components
The definiens of a metaphorical lexical unit of a polysemous vocable must reflect its semantic link
to the  lexical  unit  it  is  a  metaphor  of  within  the vocable.  This  is  done by means of  a  special
metaphor marking component. For instance, the noun ARM(N) II [the US marketing arm of a Japanese
company] is defined as follows:
[X,] Y-ing arm(N) II of Z : [X,] a part of Z that is responsible for Y
• X being a social group
• Y being an activity of Z
• Z being a social group
• ⌜ ⌝as if  X were an arm(N) I.1 of Z with which Z were doing Y
Figure 17. Definition of ARM(N) II
⌜The metaphor marking component, introduced by the expression ‘ as if⌝’, makes the  semantic
bridge – i.e. a shared semantic component – between ARM(N) II and the basic lexeme of the vocable,
ARM(N) I.1 ‘upper limb’ explicit. In other words, this component indicates the metaphor underlying
the polysemy relation between ARM(N) II and ARM(N) I.1. This component is needed to formally link
what are known as metaphorical wordsenses to their “source” lexical unit. 
More generally, while describing a polysemous vocable the lexicographer must make sure that all
lexical  units  within  this  vocable  are  directly  or  indirectly  linked  in  their  definiens  by  shared
semantic components, that is, by semantic bridges. In the case of a metaphorical lexical unit, the
metaphor marking component constitutes the necessary semantic bridge.
2.4.2 Types of Semantic Components According to their Logical Structure
Two logical  types  of  semantic  components  are  considered:  conjunctive  compound components,
which contain a logical conjunction (AND 1), and disjunctive compound components, which contain
a logical inclusive disjunction (OR 1).
A conjunctive compound component is found, for instance, in the definition of the noun WIDOW 1
[tax deduction for widows]:15
[X,] widow 1 : [X,] woman
• whose husband has died and 1 who has not remarried
Figure 18. Definition of WIDOW 1
To illustrate a disjunctive compound component, let’s take the noun DREAM(N) I [I can’t remember my
dream.]. First thing to mention is that this lexeme is the nominalization of the verb  DREAM(V) I [I
dreamt of you.], and therefore its definiens must be based on ‘X dreams(V) I of Y’ (for definitions of
14 In Spanish, los hermanos(MASC)PL lit. ‘the brothers’ can mean either ‘brothers’ or ‘brothers and sisters’; however, las
hermanas(FEM)PL ‘the sisters’ denotes exclusively women.
15 WIDOW 1 is  a  monoactantial  quasi-predicate  that  denotes  a  woman with  a  given  “social  status”  as  regards  to
marriage. It contrasts with  WIDOW 2, a relational biactantial quasi-predicate ‘[X,] Y’s widow 2’ ≡ ‘[X,] widow 1,
whose deceased husband was Y’: Vladimir’s wife is Sasha’s widow.
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derivatives, see Subsection 4.1.1 below). Moreover, this nominalization is particular in that it can be
used to denote not only the process of dreaming, but also the things dreamt of, that is the actant Y.
This leads to the following definition.
X’s dream(N) I of Y : process of X dreaming(V) I of Y or 1 Y dreamt(V) I of.
Figure 19. Definition of DREAM(N) I
This disjunctive central component of the above definiens allows for the three following uses of
DREAM(N) I, namely, to denote: the process of dreaming (4a), or the situation dreamt of (4b), or even
both at the same time (4c). This is related to the fact that ‘or 1’ stands for inclusive disjunction
(≈ and/or).
(4) a. They say a dream lasts only a few seconds. [process]
b. My dream was rather bucolic. [Y]
c. My bucolic dream was brutally interrupted. [process and Y]
In terms of  lexical functions (Mel’čuk 1996),  the noun  DREAM(N) I is  both an  S0 (a  “pure,”  or
structural, nominalization) and an S2 (an actantial nominalization – the typical name of the second
syntactic actant) of the corresponding verb DREAM(V) I.
Examples  of  (4c)  type  prevent  the  lexicographer  from  postulating  two  separate  lexemes:  one
corresponding to S0 (process) and another being S2 (the situation dreamt of). The decision to use a
disjunctive definition of one lexeme rather than two lexemes is based on the so-called  Green-
Apresjan Criterion (Mel’čuk 2013: 330–331), also known as zeugma test (Béjoint 1990: 17–18).
Another  example  of  disjunctive  definiens  component  is  found  in  the  definition  for  RAIN(N) I.1
presented above (Figure 13, 2.4.1.2): ‘water falling from the sky on Y or 1 this falling’. The noun
RAIN(N) I.1 can be used to denote the process of water falling (5a), or the water itself (5b), or both at
the same time (5c).
(5) a. The rain lasted two hours. [process]
b. The rain is cold. [water]
c. This very cold rain lasted two hours. [process and water]
3. Roles the Definition Plays in a Lexicographic Article
We will now touch on a new topic, which is characteristic of the ECL approach: the place of pride
the definition takes within a lexical entry. In our perspective, the definition is a focal point for all
properties of the headword and especially of its restricted lexical cooccurrence.
As mentioned at the very beginning of this paper, definitions have numerous potential applications
– in semantics, in scientific and technical terminography, in language teaching, in Natural Language
Processing,  etc.  But  in  the  first  place,  each  definition  plays  several  important  roles  from the
viewpoint of the coherence of the headword’s article. We consider the following three roles of the
definition, namely, accounting for:
• the semantic cooccurrence of the headword (3.1);
• its syntactic cooccurrence (3.2);
• its lexical cooccurrence (3.3). 
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3.1 Accounting for the Semantic Cooccurrence of the Headword 
The headword’s definition must, first of all, account for the (in-)compatibility of the corresponding
semanteme with other semantemes. This is illustrated by the following definition, accompanied by
examples (6a–b).
X rinses(V) Y with Z : X cleans(V) Y with Z
• Z being liquid
• by pouring Z on Y or dipping Y in Z
Figure 20. Definition of RINSE(V)
This definition ensures that sentences such as (6a–b) are identified as semantically anomalous:
(6) a. #Mark rinsed his hands with sand.
b. #Mark rinsed his hands by carefully rubbing them against each other.
In other words, definitions must prevent the production of absurdities (and tautologies) in texts.
3.2 Accounting for the Syntactic Cooccurrence of the Headword 
By introducing the variables for semantic actantial positions, the definition prepares the ground for
syntactic actants (on actants, see Mel’čuk 2015: Ch. 12): it determines their maximal number and
some of their properties. Thus, the definition of RINSE(V) above allows us to foresee for it a syntactic
object,  in  all  probability  a  direct  object,  since  the  communicatively  dominant  semanteme  is
‘clean(V)’ and the verb CLEAN(V) governs a direct object.
Similarly,  if  the  central  component  of  the  definiens  of  a  verb  is  the  semanteme  ‘person  X
communicates fact Y to person Z’, it is quite probable that this verb controls the same actantial
positions and that its semantic actants are expressed by the same syntactic actants as those of the
verb COMMUNICATE ⇔ ⇔ ⇔: ‘X’  subject, Y  direct object and ‘Z’  indirect object. Such is the case
with the verbs ANNOUNCE, DECLARE, EXPRESS or REVEAL.
However, this is no more than a loose prediction: even some quasi-synonyms of the communication
verbs above show a different syntactic pattern. Such is, for instance, the verb  INFORM: ‘person X
informs person Y of fact Z’.
(7) a. Polina communicates the news to Nikolay.
b. Polina informs Nikolay of the news.
We  are  talking  here  about  predicting,  at  least  partially,  the  active  syntactic  valence of  the
headword – that is, the set of its actant slots. However, as mentioned in 2.4.1.1, passive syntactic
valence (= the set of constructions in which the headword appears as a syntactic dependent), which
is  a  fundamental  parameter  of  syntactic  cooccurrence,  can  also  be  predicted  from the  passive
valence of the lexical  unit  expressing the central  component  of the headword’s definition.  The
passive valence of a lexical unit is determined by its part of speech and its syntactic features; and
the headword’s part of speech must correspond to the part of speech of the lexical unit expressing
the central component of its definiens.
3.3 Accounting for Restricted Lexical Cooccurrence of the Headword 
A definition must contain all pieces of information necessary to account for the restricted lexical
cooccurrence  of  the  headword.  Thus,  the  verb  APPLAUD I [They  applauded  him  for  his  brilliant
interpretation.] controls a number of collocations linked to the fact that the intensity and speed of
applauding are proportional to the degree of enjoyment/approval of the public:
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(8) a. enthusiastically <with enthusiasm>, generously, heartily, loudly, rapturously, to the echo, 
vigorously, warmly, wildly, etc.
b. faintly, lightly, politely, reluctantly, etc.
A large set of collocates expressing the (de-)intensification of the headword’s meaning indicates
that this headword is prone to (de-)intensification: its definition contains components able to receive
this modification (Iordanskaja & Polguère 2005). In the case of APPLAUD I, collocations (8a–b) are
hooked to the definition components in bold below.16
X applauds I Y for Z : ⟦ • Y having performed Z in front of X, ⟧
X claps(V) 1
• repeatedly
• to express to Y X’s positive feelings toward Z
• the intensity and speed of X’s clapping(V) 1 being 
proportional to the degree of X’s positive feelings
Figure 21. Definition of APPLAUD I
4. Lexical Units Problematic with Respect to Definitions
The definition-writing methodology that has just been presented applies to a vast majority of lexical
units.  Nevertheless, there are many difficult  cases,  which are far  from being marginal.  We will
consider  in  the  present  section  some  problematic  lexical  units,  starting  with  those  that  are
semantically full and proceeding to those that are semantically empty. We will introduce particular
descriptive techniques suitable for dealing with such lexical units, which come in two major classes:
those which can have definitions (maybe of special type) and those which cannot.
4.1 Lexical Units with Non-Standard Definitions
4.1.1 Structural Semantic Derivatives
A structural semantic derivative17 of a lexical unit differs from this lexical unit by its part of
speech only. Meaning-Text approach postulates five deep parts of speech – V(erb), S(ubstantive),
Adj(ective), Adv(erb) and Claus(ative)18 – appearing in the Deep-Syntactic Structure of sentences.
In  conformity  with  this,  there  are  five  possible  cases  of  structural  derivatives:  verbalization,
nominalization (≈ substantivization), adjectivalization, adverbialization and clausativization.
The definition of a structural derivative presents us with a paradox:
• if the meaning of a structural derivative is the same as that of its base, its definiens must be
the same as that of its base;
• however, the definiens must be of the same part of speech as the definiendum, therefore the
definiens of a structural derivative must be different from that of its base.
This paradox is solved in the following way. First, the definiens of the derivative consists of only
the  central  component  (without  peripheral  ones).  The  core  of  the  definiens  is  the  semanteme
corresponding  to  the  base  of  the  derivation,  to  which  we  add  a  redundant  semanteme  whose
16 APPLAUD II:  The Committee applauded the Government's  efforts;  CLAP(V) 1: She clapped twice, and the servant
appeared with the meal;  CLAP(V) 2: Kids were cheering and clapping.
17 Semantic derivation does not take into account relations between signifiers, contrary to morphological derivation
– the latter being a particular case of the former (Mel’čuk 2015: 160).
18 A clausative is an expression that can constitute a complete clause – all by itself or with its actants, if any: YES, NO,
WOW!, DOWN [with N]!, etc.
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lexicalization is of the same part of speech as the derivative under consideration. Such is the case,
for example,  of the definition of the noun  APPLAUSE I,  which is the nominalization of the verb
APPLAUD I, defined in Figure 21 (3.3).
X’s applause I for Y for Z : action of X applauding I Y for Z
Figure 22. Definition of APPLAUSE I
The  semanteme  ‘action’ ensures  that  the  definiens  of  APPLAUSE I is  that  of  a  noun,  but  it  is
semantically redundant, the meaning ‘applaud(V) I’ including ‘act/action’. This redundancy does not
violate  any  of  the  definition  construction  principles  introduced in  Section 2 – in  particular,  the
Equivalence principle. Note that the semantic networks (2.3.3) for  X applauds I Y for Z and  X’s
applause I for Y for Z are identical.19
Things are different in the case of adjectivalization. Let us concentrate on the important family of
adjectives  known  as  relational  adjectives:  SOLAR from  SUN,  SCHOLAR(Adj) from  SCHOOL,
INDUSTRIAL from INDUSTRY, etc. Such adjectives have to be defined in terms of their bases, the way
it is done for nominalizations. However, strictly speaking,  a relational adjective is not a “pure”
structural derivative: it is semantically slightly richer than its base. The semantic addition is brought
in by the fact of wanting to use a nominal semanteme – e.g. ‘Sun’ – to characterize another nominal
semanteme – e.g. ‘matter’, as in solar matter.  It is formally impossible because ‘matter’ cannot be
the first semantic actant of ‘Sun’, in the same way ‘apple’ is first semantic actant of ‘red’ in  red
apple; ‘Sun’ is a semantic name and cannot have actants. It is thus necessarily the case that the
meaning of the phrase  solar matter contains an “auxiliary” predicative semanteme ‘relating  [to]’,
which gives to the definiens a passive adjectival valence:
solar [X] : [X] relating to the Sun
Figure 23. Definition of SOLAR
Unlike the component ‘action [of]’ in the case of nominal derivatives, the element ‘relating [to]’ is a
genuine addition to the meaning of the source of the semantic derivation. This added meaning, very
vague, corresponds to what can be called the meaning of an adjective as a particular part of speech.
However, in actual speech, the informational content of the phrase  solar X is a hundred percent
function of the values the variable X can receive and of additional content that the Speaker supposes
inferable by the Addressee in the context of the given enunciation. For instance, the phase  solar
matter mentioned above is used by the Speaker to convey more information than simply ‘matter
relating  to  the  Sun’.  Hearing  or  reading  this  phrase,  the  Addressee  is  expected  to  understand
something like ‘matter the Sun is composed of’. The information content shown in bold does not
come for the lexical meaning of the adjective  SOLAR: it  is  inferred by the Addressee from the
linguistic context the adjective appears in. Additional contents that can be inferred from contexts of
use of SOLAR are numerous and variegated, for instance:
(9) a. solar photon: ‘photon originating from the Sun’
b. solar flare: ‘flare located on the Sun’s surface’
c. solar system: ‘[planetary] system controlled by the Sun’
Relational adjectives can also be used to modify predicative nouns of which they fill an actant slot.
In this case, neither the ‘relating  [to]’ semantic component of their definiens is activated, nor any
additional content needs to be inferred by the Addressee.  For instance, with SOLAR:
19 Names of events, states, properties, etc., are dealt with in a similar way as names of actions: ‘event of ...’, ‘state
of ...’, ‘property of ...’, etc.
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(10) a. solar mass: ‘mass of the Sun’
b. solar energy: ‘energy from the Sun’
c. solar observations: ‘observations of [= observing] the Sun’
d. solar voyage: ‘[imaginary] voyage to the Sun’
To sum up, in spite of their differences, the definitions of lexical units such as  APPLAUSE I and
SOLAR are no more than pointers towards their lexical bases. This type of meaning modeling can be
called structural derivational definitions.
4.1.2 Collocational Lexical Units
Some lexical units are selected by the Speaker as collocates, within a collocation and under control
of the collocation base – e.g. deep in deep sleep (selected as intensifier of the base sleep) or to draw
in  to draw attention (selected as support verb of the base  attention). These lexical units can be
dubbed collocational lexical units.20 These often have quite standard meaning and their definition
presents no problems. Such is, for instance, the case of many lexical units that are elements of the
value  of  the  three  syntagmatic  lexical  functions for  realization  verbs:  Reali,  Facti and
Labrealij. The notion of lexical function is  indispensable in the present  paper.  However,  we
cannot  offer  here  a  systematic  description  of  this  notion,  which  is  available  in  numerous
publications, for instance, Mel’čuk et al. (1995: Subsection 3.5) and Mel’čuk (1996, 2015: 155ff).
Let us simply illustrate what has just been said with  the verb  DRIVE(V), a  Real1 of many lexical
units denoting vehicles. It is defined as follows:
X drives(V) Y : X controls the movement of Y
• Y being a vehicle
• ( X moving with Y )
Figure 24. Definition of DRIVE(V)
Lexical units of the type of  DRIVE(V) can be selected and used independently of a base – that is,
outside of a collocation, as full-fledged, “free” lexical units. There are, however, other lexical units
that  are  uniquely  collocational and  can  be  used  only  as  collocates,  such  as  AQUILINE (nose),
ARTESIAN (well) or PYRRHIC (victory). Their definitions are also not problematic. Thus, AQUILINE is
quite naturally defined as follows:
aquiline [X] : [nose X] whose shape is curved
• like the beak of an eagle
Figure 25. Definition of AQUILINE
But between collocational lexical units like DRIVE(V) – which can be used as free lexical units – and
uniquely  collocational  lexical  units  there  is  a  large  class  of  collocational  lexical  units  whose
definition is  not straightforward.  A good example is  the adjective  HEAVY used in the following
collocations: 
20 The notion of collocation on which this discussion is based corresponds strictly to phraseological expressions made
up of a lexical element “freely” chosen by the Speaker in order to express a given meaning – the  base of the
collocation – and another  lexical  element  that  is  chosen by the Speaker  “under the control” of  the base – the
collocate of the base (Hausmann 1989; Mel’čuk 2015: 320–323).
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(11) a. heavy accent
b. heavy casualties
c. heavy fog
d. heavy accusations
e. heavy costs
f. heavy traffic
g. heavy applause
h. heavy responsibility
etc.
At first  glance,  it  might seem that the adjective  HEAVY carries different meanings in the above
collocations: ‘easily perceptible’ in heavy accent, ‘of very serious misdeeds’ in heavy accusations,
‘very enthusiastic’ in heavy applause, etc. Well, no: in point of fact, these different meanings come
from the  base  rather  than  the  collocate.  In  all  these  collocations  the  adjective  HEAVY (with  a
particular lexicographic number) expresses the same meaning, very general and abstract: that of
intensification. A collocational lexical unit of this type must receive a minimal definition – with a
definiens as general as possible; thus: 
heavy [X] : intense [X]
Figure 26. Definition of HEAVY (collocational sense)
Such a definition – an underspecified definition – resembles a simple dictionary synonymy cross-
reference (e.g., “See syn.  heavy”). However, it is a pointer to a lexical function. The semanteme
‘intense’ is one of the semantic triggers of the lexical function Magn (Iordanskaja et al. 1991), and
the above definition indicates that HEAVY is one of the value elements returned under the application
of this lexical function:
Magn( applause ) = deafening, enthusiastic, frenetic, frenzied, heavy, loud, raging, rapturous,
terrific, thunderous, tumultuous
Magn( wind ) = blusterous, blustery, brisk, gusty, heavy, high, powerful, strong
Magn( traffic ) = bumper-to-bumper, bustling, congested, dense, heavy
The elements of the value of  Magn( L ), as one sees, include collocational lexical units that are
semantically  rather  rich  – DEAFENING,  ENTHUSIASTIC,  BLUSTEROUS,  BUMPER-TO-BUMPER –  and
those that are semantically very poor – HEAVY, HIGH, STRONG.
To round up the subsection, let us mention the case of lexical items that are not collocational per se,
but can be used as a collocate within a single collocation to express a given meaning: for instance,
the adjective BLACK ‘of black color’ expressing the meaning ‘without addition of a dairy product’ in
black coffee. In this collocation the inherent, i.e. lexical, or definitional, meaning of the adjective
– ‘of black color’ – is replaced by a contextual collocational meaning of the non-standard lexical
function Without addition of a dairy product. The existence of this collocation has
no consequence on the lexicographic definition of  BLACK; it is only relevant to the lexicographic
article for COFFEE, which should contain the following information:
Without addition of a dairy product( coffee ) = black
This description is justified by the fact that this is an extremely limited usage – just with a single
base,  COFFEE.21 Lexical  units  such  as  BLACK,  that  happen  to  be  collocational  only  in  the
21 Should this usage become generalized – so that black begins to appear with the names of other drinks or dishes to
express the meaning ‘without addition of a dairy product’, we would be forced into postulating a collocational
lexical unit BLACK ‘without addition of a dairy product’.
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lexicographic description of their base, can be qualified as being contextually collocational.  They
receive no lexical entry of their own.
4.2 Lexical Units Without Definitions
4.2.1 Grammemic Lexical Units 
Some lexemes in a language with inflection are grammemic lexical units: they serve to express
analytically particular grammemes or participate in their expression. For example, English has: 
• the auxiliary verb HAVE for compound tenses; 
• the auxiliary verb BE for the passive voice and the continuous aspect; 
• the auxiliary verb WILL for the future tense; 
• the adverbs MORE and MOST for the comparative and superlative degrees of adjectives and
adverbs; 
• the articles, which express the grammemes of definite and indefinite. 
The semantic description of grammemic lexical units is not a genuine definition, but a simple cross-
reference to the corresponding grammeme, which is itself semantically characterized in the model
of the inflection; for instance, for THE:
the [X] : [X]DEFINITE
Figure 27. Semantic description of THE
4.2.2 Asemantic Lexical Units
Some lexical  units  are  used not  to  express meaning,  but  to play a purely syntactic  role  in  the
sentence – that  is,  in  order  to  ensure that  relevant  syntactic  constraints  are  observed:  these are
asemantic lexical units. Here are several examples:
• substitute pronouns: He/She/It/They fell, the person who ..., the event which ...
• semantically empty pronouns (meteorological or impersonal): It rains, It is necessary
• governed prepositions and conjunctions:  insist  on Y;  be preoccupied  with Y;  ask Y  for Z;
believe that Y
Some of these lexical units – for example, THAT(Conj) in believe that Y – are semantically empty in all
their usages, so that the problem of their definition does not arise. Some others – for example, ON I
in insist on Y – carry no meaning in a governed usage, but have an inherent meaning expressed in
other contexts, as in (12a–b):
(12) a. Vladimir is dancing on the table.
b. If there is snow on the ice, extreme caution is advised. 
The lexicographic definition of the corresponding sense of  ON – its  basic  lexical  unit  ON I – is
therefore that of a normal full lexeme:
[X] on I Y : [X] whose location is Y’s surface
• the position of Y being lower than X’s position
Figure 28. Definition of ON I
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4.2.3 “Fossil” (= Idiom-Bound) Lexical Units 
Some lexical units can be used only as components of idioms. In most cases, they belong to a
previous stage of the language and are synchronically obsolete as independent units. For this reason,
they can be termed “fossil” lexical unit. Here are a few examples of such lexical units of English:
• the noun BECK ⌜, in the idiom AT BECK AND CALL⌝;
• the noun HUE ⌜, in the idiom HUE AND CRY⌝;
• the adverb FRO ⌜, in TO AND FRO⌝.
These lexical  units  have to be considered strictly  for formal  reasons since they are part  of the
syntactic structure of the idiom they formally belong to; it is, however, impossible to give them a
semantic  characterization  without  carrying  out  an  etymological  analysis  (folk  or  genuine
etymology).  Consequently,  their  lexicographic  entries  do  not  include  a  semantic  zone,  but  are
simple cross-references to the respective idioms.
4.2.4 Lexical Units Expressing Semantic Primes
Finally, we will consider a small number of lexemes whose signified is a semantic prime – that is,
a meaning non-analyzable in the language under consideration in terms of simpler lexical meanings.
A semantic prime cannot be defined by an analytical paraphrase and must be marked as prime in its
lexicographic entry. Instead of a bona fide definition, it is supplied with an informal explanation and
usage examples, which characterize its semantic content at least approximately. Thus, the semantic
description of the lexeme NOT – as in not that long ago –, which expresses a semantic prime, is as
follows:
not [X] : Negation of X   [a semantic prime]
Figure 29. Semantic description of NOT
Now we do not have at our disposal an established list of semantic primes for English. We believe
that such a list must be a result of semantic decomposition of many thousands of English lexical
units – it is in this way that we hope to obtain the indecomposable semantemes of English. The
important particularity of our approach is that we are looking for the semantic primes of individual
languages  and  not  for  semantic  primes  of  “human  thought,”  as  does  the  Natural  Semantic
Metalanguage approach (Wierzbicka 1972:  3,  1996 and many more titles;   see a recent  list  of
semantic primes in Goddard 2012: 713). We are not sure that linguistic semantic primes are the
same for all  human languages,  but an educated guess as to what could be good candidates for
semantic prime status in English can be made. For instance, the following meanings are,  in all
probability, semantic primes:
‘something’ ‘[a] set’ [in mathematical sense]
‘more.than’ ‘space’
‘no/not’ ‘time’
‘and 1’ [= logical conjunction] ‘say’
‘or 1’ [= logical disjunction] ‘this.speech.act’
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5. Final Remarks on Lexical Connotations and Semantic Labels
For lack of space, we have not discussed such semantic characteristics of the headword that are, so
to speak, on the periphery of its meaning and, as a result, are absent from its definition. We mean
lexical connotations (5.1) and semantic labels (5.2).
5.1 Lexical Connotations
Take, for instance, the noun WIND(N). It is used not only to denote a movement of atmospheric air,
but also to convey several following ideas: 
• that of freedom (free as the wind);
• that of rapidity (swift as the wind);
• that of changing (The winds of change swept away corruption and incompetence.); 
• that of disappearing (go with the wind; throw/toss something to the wind);
• that of inconstancy (see where the wind is blowing);
• that of vacuity (words are but wind [J. Swift]; windbag). 
The semantemes corresponding to these meanings – ‘freedom’, ‘rapidity’, etc. – are not part of the
definition of the noun WIND(N): wind, as a weather phenomenon, has no connection with freedom;
there are very light and gentle winds; etc. However, these semantemes are closely associated with
WIND(N) in the linguistic conscience of English speakers. 
To formally represent these associations, the Explanatory Combinatorial Lexicology proposes the
notion of lexical connotation (Iordanskaja & Mel’čuk 1984, 2009):
The semanteme ‘σ’ is a connotation of the lexical unit L if and only if 1) ‘σ’ is not part
of L’s definition and 2) the language has a lexical unit Lσ whose signifier contains L’s
signifier and whose signified contains ‘σ’.
There are three possible cases of semantic and formal relationships between Lσ and L.
1) Lσ and L are lexemes of the same vocable – that is, they are linked by the relation of copolysemy.
Such is the case of the vocable PIG(N), which contains two Lσ lexical units.
• L = PIG(N) I: ‘farm animal ...’; connotations: voracity, untidiness and unfriendliness.
• Lσ1 = PIG(N) II.1: ‘person who is voracious – ⌜ ⌝as if  he were a pig I’ [linked to PIG(N) I by the
connotation of voracity].22
• Lσ2 = PIG(N) II.2: ‘person who is untidy and repulsive – ⌜ ⌝as if  he were a pig I’ [linked by the
connotation of untidiness].
2) Lσ is morphologically derived from L. Such is the case of the verb APE(V), derived by conversion
from the noun APE(N).
• L = APE(N): ‘humanlike wild animal ...’; connotation: mimicking habit.
• Lσ = APE(V): ‘mimic people in order to make fun – ⌜ ⌝as if  behaving like an ape’ [linked by
the connotation of mimicking habit].
3) Lσ is an idiom that formally includes L.
• L = WIND(N): ‘moving atmospheric air ...’; connotations: freedom, rapidity ... 
22 ⌜ ⌝For the use of the metaphor-marking semanteme ‘ as if ’ in definitions, see Subsection 2.4.1.6 above.
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• Lσ ⌜ = AS THE WIND⌝ 1) in the collocation  free as the wind [linked by the connotation of
freedom], 2) in the collocation swift as the wind [linked by the connotation of rapidity].
Lexical connotations and the problem of their delimitation with respect to the definition constitute a
complicated subject which deserves a separate study and cannot be developed here. 
5.2 Semantic Labels
Definitions,  as  long  as  they  are  “textual”  representations  of  their  headwords’  meaning,  are
unsuitable  for  automatic  processing  of  lexical  information.  They need  to  be  formally  encoded,
preferably in a representation that is informationally equivalent to their semantic network structure
(Subsection  2.3.3).  To  our  knowledge,  there  are  no  large-scale  lexical  resources  (electronic
dictionaries or lexical databases) that currently incorporates such computer-tractable definitions, for
any natural language. However, some level of computation can still be performed based not on full-
fledged definitions, but rather on a coarse semantic classification of lexical units. Three examples of
such computation are:
• the inheritance of definition template for lexical units belonging to given semantic classes
– see the proposed schematic definition template for tools in Subsection 2.2.3;
• more  generally,  analogical  reasoning  on  lexical  models,  where  new  lexicographic
information can be inferred from already existing one, based on the assumption that lexical
units  belonging  to  the  same  semantic  class  tend  to  share  relational  and  combinatorial
properties;
• the semantic annotation of word occurrences in texts – cf. semantic disambiguation –, where
a semantic classification, together with paradigmatic and syntagmatic lexical connections
for in lexical resources, can be used for the semantic profiling of lexical units.
To satisfy this need for semantic classification, the construction of systems of semantic labels – one
for each language under description – has been introduced in ECL methodology (Polguère 2011).
The system of  semantic  labels  used in  several  ECL’s  lexicographic  projects  (e.g.  Mel’čuk and
Polguère 2007) essentially exploits the classifying character of “closest kinds” by conceptualizing
the  semantic  labels  as  condensed  and  normalized  formulations  of  the  central  component  of
definitions (2.4.1.1), or of their semantic-class marking component (2.4.1.2), if any. It is important
to stress that ECL semantic labels are not postulated a priori but are inductively identified in the
lexicographic process: a given semantic label is  proposed when the need arises to semantically
classify a set of lexical units whose lexicographic article is being elaborated.
Semantic labels  used in lexicography are usually  hierarchically  structured to form a taxonomic
system. Such is  the case of the Corpus Pattern Analysis  (CPA) Ontology,  mentioned in  Hanks
(2017: 59). In the case of the ECL approach to semantic labeling, only semantic label classes – i.e.
sets of semantic labels that are semantic derivatives – are hierarchized. For instance, in the current
state of the English system of semantic labels, the label class DIMENSION is a subclass of the label
class PHYSICAL_CHARACTERISTIC.23 The class DIMENSION contains the following semantic
labels:
• dimension – “basic” semantic label of the class, used for nominal lexical units denoting
dimensions, e.g. HEIGHT;
23 Names of label classes are written in uppercase letters with the underscore sign replacing word spacing; names of
semantic labels are written in lowercase letters. Note that, at the present time, only the French hierarchy of semantic
labels is made available as a lexicographic by-product of the work on the French Lexical Network (Ollinger &
Polguère 2017). The English hierarchy is in its actual state a “translation” of its French counterpart.
Journal of Cognitive Science 19(4), 2018, pp. 417–470. 25/30
• something/someone that has a certain dimension – derived  label  for
noms that can be described, in terms of lexical functions, as values of S1 of nouns denoting
dimensions, e.g. GIANT(N);
• that has a certain dimension – derived  label  for  adjectives  that  can  be
described as values of A1 of nouns denoting dimensions, e.g. TALL.
Basic labels – that give their name to the corresponding semantic class – are all nominal because
only  nominal  expressions  can  be  used  to  structure  a  taxonomy.  The  main  advantage  of
distinguishing actual semantic labels from semantic classes is that it allows for a global semantic
taxonomy of lexical units where lexical units of different parts of speech but semantically very
close – such as in the above illustrations – can be grouped together.
Just as lexical connotations (5.1), semantic labels – their identification, structure and use – are a
complex topic whose discussion goes beyond the scope of the present study of definitions.
To conclude,  let  it  be emphasized that  the definition as  proposed and described here has  been
actively used in ECL for over 30 years, namely in the compilation of Explanatory Combinatorial
Dictionaries of Russian (Mel’čuk & Zholkovsky 1984, and its corrected second edition Mel’čuk &
Žolkovskij 2016) and of French (Mel’čuk et al. 1984-1988-1992-1999). The same type of approach
to  the  definition  was  independently  developed  and  applied  by  Ju.  Apresjan  and  his  teams  in
Moscow; see the most recent result: Active Dictionary of Russian (Apresjan 2014). The lexicon of a
language includes several hundred thousand lexical units; each one requires a definition, and all of
the definitions have to be standardized and tuned up to each other. Even for one language this
represents a huge amount of lexicographic work. The definitions proposed in this paper – the list of
which  is  summarized  in  the  Appendix –  is  therefore  only  a  drop  in  the  ocean  for  the  English
language.
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Appendix: Lexical Units Dealt With in the Paper (Listed By Semantic Classes)
Lexical units Location in paper
Semantic predicates
APPLAUD I Figure 21, 3.3
APPLAUSE I Figure 22, 4.1.1
AQUILINE Figure 25, 4.1.2
AUTHORIZE Figure 14, 2.4.1.3
DREAM(N) I [also a quasi predicate – cf. disjunction in the central component] Figure 19, 2.4.2
DRINK(V) Figure 15, 2.4.1.4
DRIVE(V) Figure 24, 4.1.2
HEAVY [collocational] Figure 26, 4.1.2
KISS(V) I.1 Figure 1,  2.2.1;  Figure 9
[semantic network], 2.3.3
NOT [semantic prime → non-definitional semantic description] Figure 29, 4.2.4
ON I Figure 28, 4.2.2
PAINT(V) I.1 Figure 8, 2.3.1
RINSE(V) Figure 20, 3.1
RAIN(N) I.1 [also a quasi predicate – cf. disjunction in the central component] Figure 13, 2.4.1.2
SOLAR Figure 23, 4.1.1
TEACH Figure 16, 2.4.1.5
Semantic quasi-predicates
ARM(N) II Figure 17, 2.4.1.6
CARROT I.1 Figure 10, 2.4.1.1
FILE(N)1 4 Figure 7, 2.2.3
PAINT(N) I Figure 4, 2.2.2
TABLECLOTH Figure 5, 2.2.3
WIDOW 1 Figure 18, 2.4.2
Definition pattern for lexical units denoting tools Figure 6, 2.2.3
Semantic name
SUN Figure 2, 2.2.1
Grammemic lexical unit →[  Non-definitional semantic description]
THE Figure 27, 4.2.1
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